c. **Synonyms:**

*Most common synonyms:*
Authenticity; integrity; truthfulness

*Wikipedia*
Integrity; sincerity; truth

*Thesaurus.com*
Confidence; candor; veracity; virtue; probity; frankness; loyalty; honor; self-respect; responsibility; sincerity; fairness; faithfulness; integrity; rectitude; morality; soundness; openness; right; conscientiousness; plainness; justness; uprightness; genuineness; scrupulousness; principles; goodness; equity; incorruptibility; fidelity; trustworthiness; trustiness; impeccability; bluntness; outspokenness; straightness; straightforwardness; reputability; evenhandedness

d. **Antonyms:**

*Wikipedia*
Lie

*Thesaurus.com*
Corruption; disgrace; dishonesty; dishonor; disloyalty; distrust; evil; falsehood; immorality; unfairness; unjustness; artifice; cheating; deceit; deception; duplicity; fraud; fraudulence; lying; treachery

e. **Other related terms:**

1. Moral disengagement (Bandura et al., 1996)
2. Moral ambiguity (Green, 2006)
3. Moral wrongfulness (cheating, deception, stealing, coercion and exploitation, disloyalty, promise-breaking, disobedience) (Green, 2006)
4. Disclosure, lie-telling, witness (e.g. Segovia & Crossman, 2012; Talwar, V. & Crossman, A.M., 2012)
5. Self-control, self-regulation (e.g. Mead, Baumeister, et al. 2009)
Kay Bussey (suggested in Peterson & Seligman, 2004; repeatedly cited by Talwar et al.)

Email: kay.bussey@mq.edu.au

Position: Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, Macquarie University

Research Interests: Children’s social development: gender development, children’s truth telling and lying, bullying, children’s eye-witness testimony, and child abuse.

Relevant Publications:


Victoria Talwar

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Website: [http://www.talwarresearch.com/](http://www.talwarresearch.com/)

Position: McGill University


Relevant Publications:


**Dan Ariely**  
*Email:* dan@danariely.com  
*Position:* James B. Duke Professor of Psychology Behavioral Economics, Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University  
*Research Interests:* How people actually act in the marketplace, as opposed to how they should or would perform if they were completely rational. Wide range of daily behaviors such as buying (or not), saving (or not), ordering food in restaurants, pain management, procrastination, dishonesty, and decision making under different emotional states.

*Relevant Publications:*


Mike Norton and Dan Ariely (Forthcoming) “From Thinking Too Little to Thinking Too Much: A Continuum of Decision Making.” *Cognitive Science.*


Lionel Trilling (suggested in Peterson & Seligman, 2004)

**Hartshorne, May & Shuttleworth**
“According to Situationists, the empirical evidence favors their view of moral character over the Traditional View. Hugh Hartshorne and M. A. May’s study of the trait of honesty among school children found no cross-situational correlation. A child may be consistently honest with his friends, but not with his parents or teachers. From this and other studies, Hartshorne and May concluded that character traits are not robust but rather “specific functions of life situations””(Wikipedia, 2013)

*Relevant publications:*

**David Callahan – CheatingCulture.com**
*Email: dcallahan@demos.org*
*Position: Senior Fellow at Demos, a public policy center based in New York City that he co-founded in 1999.*

*Relevant publications:*
Measures

Listed in Peterson & Seligman, 2004, pp. 256-258:

*Personal Value Scales* (described in J. Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991): designed to assess the extent to which individuals admire specific values (e.g. honesty, kindness, loyalty).

*Specific Interpersonal Trust Scale* (described in J. Robinson, Shaver, & Wrightsman, 1991): designed to assess the degree of interpersonal trust held by one individual for a specific other person.

*Personality Traits Scale* (Rind & Gaudet, 1993): designed to assess attributes in young adolescents (e.g. honesty, leadership skills, and trustworthiness).

*Station Employee Applicant Inventory* (London House, Inc., 1999): designed to assess honesty, interpersonal cooperation, drug avoidance, temperament, etc.

*Comparative Emphasis Scale* (Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989): designed to assess workplace values (e.g. honesty and integrity).

*Personnel Selection Inventory* (London House, Inc., 1999): designed to assess work values, employee-customer relations, honesty, etc.

*Employee Integrity Index* (described in Alligner, Lilienfeld, & Mitchell, 1996): designed to assess dishonesty in the workplace.

*Stanton Survey* (Klump, Reed, & Perman, 1985): designed to assess employee attitudes and behaviors in relation to company morale, stealing, dishonesty, etc.

*Phase II Profile Integrity Status Inventory* (Lousig-Nont & Ishmael, 1985): designed to screen prospective employee’s attitudes toward honesty.

*Academic Integrity Interview* (Stiff, Corman, Krizek, & Snider, 1994): designed to assess college students’ attitudes and practices regarding academic honesty.

*Psychological Screening Inventory – Endorsement of Excessive Virtue* (Lanyon, 1993): designed to identify persons who portray themselves as very high in personal virtuousness (e.g. total honesty, moral excellence, thorough trustworthiness).
Truthfulness Measure (A. Kelly, Kahn, & Coulter, 1996): designed to assess how truthful participants report their “self-presentations” to a counselor.

Honesty and Kindness Story Tasks (Lamborn, Fischer, & Pipp, 1994): designed to assess children’s and youth’s ability to understand and explain stories about honesty and kindness.

Imaginative Endings (Sumner, 1976): designed to assess self-reliance, integrity, self-respect-honesty, etc. in adolescents aged 13 to 18.

From reviewed studies (involving children):

• Common measures (Bussey, 2013; see Lyon, 1999 for methodological problems of some of these measures):
  o Correct identification of lies and truthful statements
  o Children’s evaluative reactions, such as guilt or pride, associated with lying and truthfulness
  o Moral judgments of lies -vs- moral judgments truthfulness
• Modified Temptation Resistance Paradigm (see Talwar & Crossman, 2012 for examples of studies that use this paradigm)
Reference resources

a. Books, book chapters, and documents


- “Dishonesty and mistrust are not free. Their cost can destroy the foundation of our economy and prosperity.” (p. 5).
- “An effective way to increase trust is to establish trustworthy institutions and reliable systems.” (p. 55).
- Chapter 1 (pp. 9 – 24): cases of dishonesty in America (e.g. scandals of political frauds).
- pp. 27-45: justifications and acceptance of dishonesty behavior.
- Chapter 4 (pp. 59 - 77): about deception and truth.
- Chapter 7 (pp. 105 – 118): morality, law
- Chapter 12 (pp. 189 – 206): “toward an honest society”


- Main purpose of the book: “to explain the underlying moral content of white-collar criminal law.” (p. 6)
- Deception refers to “the communication of a message with which the communicator, in communicating, intends to mislead –that is, the communication of a message that is intended to cause a person to believe something that is untrue.” (Green, 2006, p. 76). There is no
deception unless the communicator has the intention to mislead. “Untrue statements made by mistake are not deceptive, although they might cause a listener to be mislead” (Green, 2006, p. 76).


A summary interpretation of the extensive studies conducted by the Character Education Inquiry into the problems of children’s honesty, self-control and helpfulness.


Authenticity:
- Honesty is essential in close relationships. “Lerner further distinguishes between honesty, which can sometimes represent the uncensored expression of negative thoughts and feelings, and truth, which requires thought, timing, tact, and empathy for the other person’s position (...) Honesty, therefore, is often not the best policy if it does not contain the elements of truth-telling that will facilitate, rather than jeopardize, relationships” (p. 391).


Quotes highlighted in the book:
“Honesty is the best policy” - Miguel de Cervantes
“Be so true to thyself as thou be not false to others” - Francis Bacon
“Honesty is the best chapter in the book of wisdom” - Thomas Jefferson
“Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles” - Confucius

Related words used in the book:
- Integrity, self-worth, faithfulness, sincerity.
- Deception, lie, deceit, dishonesty, falsehood.

“Be honest with yourself and others. Learn to know your real self” (p. 332).


b. Journal articles and abstracts

i. Psychology – empirical studies


The last decade has seen major developments in the legal arena concerning the evidential interviewing of children. Research evidence clarifying the ability of children to provide valid and reliable information has been incorporated into the development of evidential interviewing techniques. This in turn has focused attention on the importance of training. Despite the increase in training, research with both child and adult interviewers has shown that inappropriate questioning strategies and poorly structured interviews still typify a significant number of investigations. This study evaluated the effect of a 1-week intensive training course on police and social worker forensic interviewing with children and investigated the actual types of questions employed by interviewers. Analysis of videoed interviews was used to compare trained and untrained interviewers on a series of rating scales designed to assess interviewer performance. The number of requests for free reports and the number of open, specific, leading, and nonleading questions used were obtained. The study found no differences in performance between trained and untrained interviewers on any rated behaviors with both trained and untrained interviewers rating poorly. Specific and leading questions were found to occupy over half the total number of questions used by both sets of interviewers, and few free report requests were used. That is, interviewers mostly asked the types of questions least likely to obtain valid and reliable information from children, with no evident variation from this pattern within the trained group. These findings echo the results of other studies in suggesting that interviewers use inappropriate questioning strategies to obtain information even after training and rely heavily on specific rather than open questioning. The results of this study suggest that the frequently adopted model of the short, intensive training course may not be the most effective way of training investigators to interview children, and more research is needed to establish the best way forward.


This study investigated the relations of the proposed sixth factor of personality, Honesty-Humility, with the dimensions of the classic English lexical Big Five and the closely related Five-Factor Model (FFM). Results showed that although Honesty-Humility was largely unrelated to markers of the Big
Five factors, it was substantially correlated with the FFM Agreeableness domain. This relation was largely due to the Straightforwardness and Modesty facets of FFM Agreeableness, which were only weakly correlated with the Big Five version of Agreeableness. A realignment of FFM facets to produce separate Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness factors provided better prediction of personality variables that involve deceit without hostility, such as Social Adroitness and Self-Monitoring. Results indicate the importance of assessing Honesty-Humility as a separate factor.


In a study designed to determine whether experience in day care or preschool affects children’s knowledge and enactment of prosocial behaviors, 59 children in day care, preschool, and home care were pre- and post-tested concerning: (1) their understanding of helping, sharing, comforting, honesty, and civic awareness; (2) their definitions of helping, sharing, comforting, and honest behaviors; and (3) their judgment of what their behavior would be in helping, sharing, comforting, or honesty dilemmas. Scores did not differ between groups for any dependent variable other than civic awareness. Preschool children scored higher than day care or home care children on civic awareness. Civic awareness scores were divided into awareness of national symbols, government figures, historical figures, religious figures, and Star Wars and cartoon characters. Preschool children scored higher on awareness in all categories except Star Wars and cartoon characters, for which the three groups did not differ. Data indicated that: (1) participation in a high quality child program expands a child’s awareness of the world; (2) knowledge of cartoon and film figures appears to be part of the culture of childhood and is held by most children; (3) alternative and supplemental childrearing experiences do not necessarily affect children’s prosocial values and notions of honesty.


This research examined the role of mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Regulatory self-sanctions can be selectively disengaged from detrimental conduct by converting harmful acts to moral ones through linkage to worthy purposes, obscuring personal causal agency by diffusion and displacement of responsibility, misrepresenting or disregarding the injurious effects inflicted on others, and vilifying the recipients of maltreatment by blaming and dehumanizing them. The study examined the structure and impact of moral disengagement on detrimental conduct and the psychological processes through which it exerts its effects. Path analyses reveal that moral disengagement fosters detrimental conduct by reducing prosocialness and anticipatory self-censure and by promoting cognitive and affective reactions conducive to aggression. The structure of the paths of influence is very similar for interpersonal aggression and delinquent conduct. Although the various mechanisms of moral disengagement operate in concert, moral reconstruals of harmful conduct by linking it to worthy purposes and vilification of victims seem to contribute most heavily to engagement in detrimental activities.

The primary aim of this research was to assess the adequacy of postexperimental inquiries (PEI) used in deception research, as well as to examine whether mood state, reward, or administering the PEI as a face-to-face interview or computer survey impacts participants' willingness to divulge suspicion or knowledge about a study. We also sought to determine why participants are not always forthcoming on the PEI. Study 1 examined how frequently PEIs are included in research and found that most researchers employing deception do use a PEI. Studies 2 and 3 showed that participants are often unwilling to divulge suspicion or awareness of deception or to admit to having prior knowledge about a study, though offering a reward and completing the PEI on a computer modestly improved awareness and admission rates. Study 4 indicated several reasons why participants may not reveal suspicion or knowledge about a study on the PEI.


Research on the two fundamental dimensions of social judgment, namely warmth and competence, has shown that warmth has a primary and a dominant role in information gathering about others. In two studies we examined whether the sociability and morality components of warmth play distinct roles in such a process. Study 1 (N = 60) investigated which traits were mostly selected when forming impressions about others. The results showed that, regardless of the task goal, traits related to morality and sociability were differently processed. Furthermore, participants were more interested in obtaining information about morality than about sociability when asked to form a global impression about others. Study 2 (N = 498) explored the adoption of asymmetric/symmetric strategies when asking questions to make inferences on others. As predicted, participants adopted an asymmetrically disconfirming strategy on morality traits, while they looked for more symmetrical evidence on sociability or competence traits. Overall, our findings indicated a distinct and a dominant role of the moral component of warmth in the information-gathering process.


We run an experiment to study the relationship between honesty, age and self-control. We focus on children aged between 5 and 15 as the literature suggests that self-control develops within such age range. We ask each child to toss a fair coin in private and to record the outcome (white or black) on a paper sheet. We only reward children who report white. Although we are unable to tell whether each child was honest or not, we speculate about the proportion of reported white outcomes. Children report the prize-winning outcome at rates statistically above 50% but below 100%. Moreover, the probability of cheating is uniform across groups based on child's characteristics, in particular age. In a second treatment we explicitly tell children not to cheat. This request has a dampening effect on their tendency to over-report the prize-winning outcome, especially in girls. Furthermore, while this effect in boys is constant with age, in girls it tends to decrease with age.

Preschool (M = 4.9 years), second- (M = 7.8 years), and fifth- (M = 11.0 years) grade children’s definitions of, moral standards for, and internal evaluative reactions to both lies and truthful statements were investigated. The influence of 4 factors on these judgments was also examined: the falsity of the statement, the content of the statement, whether or not the statement was believed, and whether or not the statement resulted in punishment. Results revealed that while the older children identified almost all statements correctly, preschoolers correctly identified about 70% of lies and truthful statements. Lies were rated as worse than truthful statements by all age groups; however, only the second and fifth graders ascribed feelings of pride to story characters after truthfulness. Implications of these findings for children’s moral development are discussed.


This study investigated the ability of children from three age groups (4, 8, and 11 years of age; N = 72) to categorize three different types of intentionally false and true statements as lies and truths, and also measured their evaluation of such statements. Results revealed that the older children were more likely to categorize false statements as lies and true statements as truths than were the 4-year-olds. All children evaluated telling lies as worse than telling truths. Antisocial lies were rated as the most serious lie type and “white lies” as the least serious. Anticipated regulatory control was more advanced for the 8- and 11-year-olds, who expected both self-approval for truth-telling and self-disapproval for lying for two of the three truth and lie types; the younger children did not anticipate greater self-approval for truth-telling and self-disapproval for lying for any of the truth and lie types.


This research examines whether children’s difficulties with deception and false belief arise from a lack of inhibitory control rather than from a conceptual deficit. In 3 studies, 3-year-olds deceived frequently under conditions requiring relatively low inhibitory control (e.g., misleading pictorial cues or arrows) but failed to do so under conditions of high inhibitory control (deceptive pointing). Study 2 ruled out that the findings were due to social intimidation: Children were equally successful using an arrow to deceive under anonymous and public conditions. Study 3 indicated that, under well-controlled conditions, children did not reveal greater understanding of false belief in deceptive than nondeceptive conditions. The results of these studies suggest that children may have greater deceptive abilities than some earlier studies indicated, and that the source of their difficulty on deceptive pointing tasks lies in a failure of inhibitory control. More generally, it is argued that children’s performance on false belief tasks is also likely to be affected by inhibition deficits.

The effectiveness of self-instructional training using broad verbal mediators in promoting generalization of honest behavior was examined. First and fourth graders were assigned to 1 of 6 treatment conditions, generated from the combination of 3 levels of the terms employed in training (do–don’t; cheating; honesty) and 2 types of instructional technique (self-instructional training; external instructions by experimenter). The procedures consisted of 5 pretreatment temptation tests in a first session, a treatment task and 5 posttreatment temptation tests in a second session, and a moral concept interview in a third session. Results indicated that the most general training term employed, "honesty," was most effective in promoting generalized honest behavior. This was particularly evident for females trained to use verbal self-instructions. Overall consistency of behavior significantly increased after training, though not as a result of a specific training condition. This increase was most pronounced for fourth graders. The significance of general verbal labels, limitations of self-instructional strategies, and consistency as a developmental variable are discussed.


Attachment security is hypothesized to promote authenticity and sincerity, or honesty, whereas insecurity is hypothesized to increase various forms of inauthenticity and dishonesty. The authors tested these ideas in 8 studies of dispositional and situational attachment insecurities and their influence on inauthenticity and dishonesty. The first 4 studies showed that authenticity is related to scoring low on the 2 dimensions of dispositional attachment insecurity-anxiety and avoidance-and that these 2 dimensions are associated with different aspects of inauthenticity. The first set of studies also showed that conscious and unconscious security priming increased state authenticity (compared with neutral or insecurity priming). The last 4 studies showed that attachment insecurity is related to dishonesty (lying and cheating) and that security priming reduces the tendency to lie or cheat and does so more effectively than positive mood priming. Implications for understanding the role of authenticity and inauthenticity in various relationship contexts are discussed.


This paper reviews and critiques research pertaining to the three most commonly used honesty tests. Honesty tests, sometimes called integrity tests, purportedly predict theft by employees. Secondary analyses were performed to remove the effect of faking good from validity coefficients with various self-report criteria, and to supplement other analyses. The honesty tests were found to have: (a) virtually no foundation in personality or attitude theory, (b) a corrected average correlation of .08 with objective indices of theft (95% confidence interval: .03 < r < .14), (c) a Taylor-Russel utility of approximately 1% above base rate of success, and (d) a false positive rate of .44 if only nontrivial thefts are considered. The honesty tests reviewed are of such marginal validity (less than 1% of the criterion variance accounted for) that their continued use in pre-employment settings is seriously questioned. The comparability of these review results with those of other reviewers is discussed along with the social and legal implications of honesty testing.

Recently, similar six-factor solutions have emerged in lexical studies across languages, giving rise to the HEXACO model of personality. As a core extension of its most well-known predecessor, the five-factor model, the HEXACO model distinguishes between two factors predicting complimentary aspects of pro-social behavior or, more specifically, reciprocal altruism: Honesty–Humility (the tendency toward active cooperation, i.e. non-exploitation) and Agreeableness (the tendency toward reactive cooperation, i.e. non-retaliation). However, this dissociation has not yet been tested to its full extent. To this end, we herein present re-analyses of published studies (N = 1090), showing that Honesty–Humility, but not Agreeableness, indeed predicts active cooperation. More importantly, in a new experiment (N = 410), we found a pattern of two concurrent selective associations, supporting the theoretical distinction between the two factors: Honesty–Humility (but not Agreeableness) predicted active cooperation (non-exploitation in the dictator game), whereas Agreeableness (but not Honesty–Humility) was linked to reactive cooperation (non-retaliation in the ultimatum game).


Children’s ability to deceive was examined in order to determine whether they are able to hide their emotional expression intentionally. Three-year-olds were instructed not to peek at a toy while the experimenter left the room. When asked, the great majority either denied that they peeked or would not answer the question. Facial and bodily activity did not differentiate the deceivers from the truth tellers. Boys were more likely than girls to admit their transgression. These results indicate that very young children have begun to learn how to mask their emotional expressions and support the role of socialization in this process.


This study examined the effects of coaching (encouragement and rehearsal of false reports) and truth induction (a child-friendly version of the oath or general reassurance about the consequences of disclosure) on 4- to 7-year-old maltreated children’s reports (N5198). Children were questioned using free recall, repeated yes–no questions, and highly suggestive suppositional questions. Coaching impaired children’s accuracy. For free-recall and repeated yes–no questions, the oath exhibited some positive effects, but this effect diminished in the face of highly suggestive questions. Reassurance had few positive effects and no ill effects. Neither age nor understanding of the meaning and negative consequences of lying consistently predicted accuracy. The results support the utility of truth induction in enhancing the accuracy of child witnesses’ reports. The results support the utility of truth induction in enhancing the accuracy of child witnesses’ reports.
The opportunity to profit from dishonesty evokes a motivational conflict between the temptation to cheat for selfish gain and the desire to act in a socially appropriate manner. Honesty may depend on self-control given that self-control is the capacity that enables people to override antisocial selfish responses in favor of socially desirable responses. Two experiments tested the hypothesis that dishonesty would increase when people's self-control resources were depleted by an initial act of self-control. Depleted participants misrepresented their performance for monetary gain to a greater extent than did non-depleted participants (Experiment 1). Perhaps more troubling, depleted participants were more likely than non-depleted participants to expose themselves to the temptation to cheat, thereby aggravating the effects of depletion on cheating (Experiment 2). Results indicate that dishonesty increases when people’s capacity to exert self-control is impaired, and that people may be particularly vulnerable to this effect because they do not predict it.


(No abstract)


Current theory and experimental research suggests that children's discovery of false beliefs at around 4 years of age allows the development of intentional deception. Anecdotal evidence of earlier lies has been dismissed with the argument that they may be 'blind' learned strategies rather than genuine deception. This paper presents two studies of everyday deception in comparison with false-belief task performance in young children. Study 1, a longitudinal study of 24 children, shows that the variety and incidence of everyday deceptions reported by mothers did not relate to success or failure on a battery of false-belief tasks, either between different children or over time in the same children. In Study 2 the deceptions of a 2½-year-old child over a 6-month period were shown to be varied, flexible, context appropriate and too complex to be 'blind' learned strategies. It is argued that children's deceptive skills develop from pragmatic need and situational exigencies rather than from conceptual developments; they may learn to lie in the same way as they learn to speak.


Perceptions of lie acceptability vary as a function of the motivation for the lie, the relationship between deceiver and deceived, and the perceiver's cultural background. The current study examines the relation between one cultural background—that is, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day...
Saints (LDS)—and perceptions of lie acceptability, and whether this varies as a function of lie and rater characteristics. Participants rated lie acceptability in 12 scenarios varying lie motivation and lie recipient. Overall, the LDS group rated lies as less acceptable than did the non-LDS group, and lie acceptability varied according to lie motivation and lie recipient. Participant age was negatively correlated with lie acceptability. Implications of the findings and directions for future research are discussed.


Reports a marked development between the ages of 3 and 5 yrs in children's ability to conceal information. In a situation of high-affect involvement, 3-yr-olds did not know to misinform or withhold information from a competitor who always chose the object for which they themselves had previously stated a preference. Although only 29% of 3-yr-olds knew to influence the competitor's mental state, 87% knew to physically exclude the competitor. There was no difference between children's performance when trying to obtain the object for themselves or predicting what a story character would do. The success of the older children in concealing information indicated their new representational understanding that to influence another’s behavior, one must influence that person’s mental state.


Videotaped stories depicting deliberate lies and unintentionally untrue statements were presented to 200 subjects evenly divided into the following age groups: 5, 8, 9, and 11 years and adult. Definitions of lying were seen to change gradually over this age range. Adults were more lenient than children in their moral evaluations of all the statements. All age groups rated a guess that did no harm as better than one that caused trouble, and they all judged selfishly motivated lies to be worse than both unintended falsehoods and “jocose” lies that aimed to please the listener. 11-year-olds tended to justify the prohibition against lying in terms of trust and fairness, whereas younger children cited authority’s punitive sanctions.


88 6-yr-olds and 88 10-yr-olds took part, in pairs, in a contrived interaction with a "magician." The children were interviewed 10 days and 10 wks later in 1 of 4 conditions: no cues, context cues, relevant cues, and irrelevant cues. Older children recalled more accurate information than younger children, and both groups recalled more accurate information after the short than the long delay. Although relevant cues facilitated free recall, accuracy did not differ across cue conditions. Younger children were less likely to report an accident they had been asked to keep secret than were older children. Children's understanding of truth and lies did not predict errors in free recall or their reporting of the secret.

A paradigm devised by M. Lewis, C. Stanger, and M. W. Sullivan (1989) was adapted to study deception and false-belief understanding. In Study 1, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to touch a toy in the experimenter's absence. Just over half of the children touched the toy, and of those children, the majority denied having done so. Of control children who were given permission to touch the toy, all touched it and admitted having done so. In Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds were asked not to look in a box to identify its contents. Almost all children looked, most denied having looked, and a minority consistently feigned ignorance of the contents. False-belief understanding was linked to denial of looking but not to feigning ignorance. Of control children who were given permission to look, all acknowledged looking, and they almost always revealed their knowledge of the contents. The studies confirm that preschoolers deceive in the context of a minor misdemeanor but are less effective at feigning ignorance.


Children tell prosocial lies for self- and other-oriented reasons. However, it is unclear how motivational and socialization factors affect their lying. Furthermore, it is unclear whether children's moral understanding and evaluations of prosocial lie scenarios (including perceptions of vignette characters' feelings) predict their actual prosocial behaviors. These were explored in two studies. In Study 1, 72 children (36 second graders and 36 fourth graders) participated in a disappointing gift paradigm in either a high-cost condition (lost a good gift for a disappointing one) or a low-cost condition (received a disappointing gift). More children lied in the low-cost condition (94%) than in the high-cost condition (72%), with no age difference. In Study 2, 117 children (42 preschoolers, 41 early elementary school age, and 34 late elementary school age) participated in either a high- or low-cost disappointing gift paradigm and responded to prosocial vignette scenarios. Parents reported on their parenting practices and family emotional expressivity. Again, more children lied in the low-cost condition (68%) than in the high-cost condition (40%); however, there was an age effect among children in the high-cost condition. Preschoolers were less likely than older children to lie when there was a high personal cost. In addition, compared with truth-tellers, prosocial liars had parents who were more authoritative but expressed less positive emotion within the family. Finally, there was an interaction between children's prosocial lie-telling behavior and their evaluations of the protagonist's and recipient's feelings. Findings contribute to understanding the trajectory of children's prosocial lie-telling, their reasons for telling such lies, and their knowledge about interpersonal communication.


Recent research suggests that refraining from cheating in tempting situations requires self-control, which indicates that serving self-interest is an automatic tendency. However, evidence also suggests that people cheat to the extent that they can justify their unethical behavior to themselves. To merge these different lines of research, we adopted a dual-system approach that distinguished between the
intuitive and deliberative cognitive systems. We suggest that for people to restrict their dishonest behavior, they need to have enough time and no justifications for self-serving unethical behavior. We employed an anonymous die-under-cup task in which participants privately rolled a die and reported the outcome to determine their pay. We manipulated the time available for participants to report their outcome (short vs. ample). The results of two experiments support our prediction, revealing that the dark side of people’s automatic self-serving tendency may be overcome when time to decide is ample and private justifications for dishonesty are not available.


In 2 studies, college students evidenced differing levels of the "Big-Five" traits in different roles, supporting social-contextualist assumptions regarding trait expression. Supporting organismic theories of personality, within-subject variations in the Big Five were predictable from variations in the degree of psychological authenticity felt in different roles. In addition, two concepts of self-integration or true selfhood were examined: 1 based on high consistency of trait profiles across roles (i.e., low self-concept differentiation; E. M. Donahue, R. W. Robins, B. W. Roberts, & O. P. John, 1993) and 1 based on high mean levels of authenticity felt across roles. The 2 self-integration measures were found to be independent predictors of psychological and physical well-being indicating that both self-consistency and psychological authenticity are vital for organized functioning and health.


People routinely engage in dishonest acts without feeling guilty about their behavior. When and why does this occur? Across four studies, people justified their dishonest deeds through moral disengagement and exhibited motivated forgetting of information that might otherwise limit their dishonesty. Using hypothetical scenarios (Studies 1 and 2) and real tasks involving the opportunity to cheat (Studies 3 and 4), the authors find that one’s own dishonest behavior increased moral disengagement and motivated forgetting of moral rules. Such changes did not occur in the case of honest behavior or consideration of the dishonest behavior of others. In addition, increasing moral saliency by having participants read or sign an honor code significantly reduced unethical behavior and prevented subsequent moral disengagement. Although dishonest behavior motivated moral leniency and led to forgetting of moral rules, honest behavior motivated moral stringency and diligent recollection of moral rules.

Academic honesty is under-researched in contrast to academic dishonesty. A majority of students self-report cheating in college. A low probability of punishment is reflected by few tried cases of academic misconduct. The authors argue that students who are in the minority by not engaging in academic dishonesty show considerable character strength and are examples of everyday heroes. The authors consider heroes persons who are courageous, have empathic concern for others, and have a high degree of honesty. Experiment 1 established courage, empathy, and honesty as predictors of academic honesty. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and found heroism to be predictive of students’ future intent to cheat. These experiments have constructed an effective working model of heroism in the context of the academic environment.


In this investigation, we reexamine the claim that young children regard all false statements as lies. Children aged 3 to 5 years were shown 2 teddy bears. One bear had seen that bread which appeared edible was in reality moldy; the other had not seen the moldy contaminant. Both bears told an uninformed friend that the bread was okay to eat. When asked to identify a bear as lying or mistaken, rather than as lying or not lying, many children of all ages responded correctly. We suggest that, when care is taken to clarify the form of question, a rudimentary understanding of lies and mistakes is evident in domains such as food and contamination that provide constraints for learning.


The ability to understand false beliefs is critical to a concept of mind. Chandler, Fritz, and Hala challenge recent claims that this ability emerges only at around 4 years of age. They report that 2- and 3-year-olds remove true trails and lay false ones to mislead someone about the location of a hidden object. Experiment 1 confirmed that 2- and 3-year-olds produce apparently deceptive ploys, but they produce them less often than 4-year-olds, require prompting, and rarely anticipate their impact on the victim’s beliefs or search. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that 3-year-olds produce deceptive and informative ploys indiscriminately, whether asked to mislead a competitor or inform a collaborator. By contrast, 4-year-olds act selectively. The results support earlier claims that an understanding of false beliefs and deceptive ploys emerges at around 4 years of age. 2- and 3-year-olds can be led to produce such ploys but show no clear understanding of their effect.


This study examined the developmental questions of when children begin to use the terms lie and truth, how they understand them, and when their understanding approaches that of adults. 150 subjects in 5 groups (nursery schoolers, preschoolers, first graders, fifth graders, and adults) were presented a series of 8 short puppet plays that systematically varied the presence or absence of the 3 prototype elements: factuality of a statement, the speaker’s belief in the factuality or falsity of the statement, and the speaker’s intent to deceive the listener. The interactions of age,
factuality, and belief most fully accounted for the use of the terms *lie* and *truth*. Persons at different ages differentially weighed the prototypic elements. Responses of fifth graders were transitional between those of the younger children and adults. The results are interpreted as supporting the development of definitional prototypes for these moral concepts.


How does one deal with unfair behaviors? This subject has long been investigated by various disciplines including philosophy, psychology, economics, and biology. However, our reactions to unfairness differ from one individual to another. Experimental economics studies using the ultimatum game (UG), in which players must decide whether to accept or reject fair or unfair offers, have also shown that there are substantial individual differences in reaction to unfairness. However, little is known about psychological as well as neurobiological mechanisms of this observation. We combined a molecular imaging technique, an economics game, and a personality inventory to elucidate the neurobiological mechanism of heterogeneous reactions to unfairness. Contrary to the common belief that aggressive personalities (impulsivity or hostility) are related to the high rejection rate of unfair offers in UG, we found that individuals with apparently peaceful personalities (straightforwardness and trust) rejected more often and were engaged in personally costly forms of retaliation. Furthermore, individuals with a low level of serotonin transporters in the dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN) are honest and trustful, and thus cannot tolerate unfairness, being candid in expressing their frustrations. In other words, higher central serotonin transmission might allow us to behave adroitly and opportunistically, being good at playing games while pursuing self-interest. We provide unique neurobiological evidence to account for individual differences of reaction to unfairness.


The development of lying to conceal one’s own transgression was examined in school-age children. Children (N = 172) between 6 and 11 years of age were asked not to peek at the answer to a trivia question while left alone in a room. Half of the children could not resist temptation and peeked at the answer. When the experimenter asked them whether they had peeked, the majority of children lied. However, children’s subsequent verbal statements, made in response to follow-up questioning, were not always consistent with their initial denial and, hence, leaked critical information to reveal their deceit. Children’s ability to maintain consistency between their initial lie and subsequent verbal statements increased with age. This ability is also positively correlated with children’s 2nd-order belief scores, suggesting that theory of mind understanding plays an important role in children’s ability to lie consistently.

The present study compared the lie-telling behavior of 3- and 4-year-old West African children (N = 84) from either a punitive or a nonpunitive school. Children were told not to peek at a toy when left alone in a room. Most children could not resist the temptation and peeked at the toy. When the experimenter asked them if they had peeked, the majority of the punitive school peekers lied about peeking at the toy while significantly fewer nonpunitive school children did so. The punitive school children were better able to maintain their deception than nonpunitive school children when answering follow-up questions. Thus, a punitive environment not only fosters increased dishonesty but also children's abilities to lie to conceal their transgressions.


The present study examined lying behaviour in children between 3 and 7 years of age with two experiments. A temptation resistance paradigm was used in which children were left alone in a room with a music-playing toy placed behind their back. The children were told not to peek at the toy. Most children could not resist the temptation and peeked at the toy. When the experimenter asked them whether they had peeked, about half of the 3-year-olds confessed to their transgression, whereas most older children lied. Naive adult evaluators (undergraduate students and parents) who watched video clips of the children's responses could not discriminate lie-tellers from nonliars on the basis of their nonverbal expressive behaviours. However, the children were poor at semantic leakage control and adults could correctly identify most of the lie-tellers based on their verbal statements made in the same context as the lie. The combined results regarding children's verbal and nonverbal leakage control suggest that children under 8 years of age are not fully skilled lie-tellers.


Child witnesses must undergo a competence examination in which they must show appropriate conceptual understanding of lying and truth-telling, and promise to tell the truth. Three experiments (Ns = 123, 103, 177) were conducted to address the assumptions underlying the court competence examination that (1) children who understand lying and its moral implications are less likely to lie and (2) discussing the conceptual issues concerning lying and having children promising to tell the truth promotes truth-telling. Both measures of lying and understanding of truth- and lie-telling were obtained from children between 3 and 7 years of age. Most children demonstrated appropriate conceptual knowledge of lying and truth-telling and the obligation to tell the truth, but many of the same children lied to conceal their own transgression. Promising to tell the truth significantly reduced lying. Implications for legal systems are discussed.

This study examined the extent to which children believe that truth telling is compromised by negative outcome expectancies. It also investigated the efficacy of two types of appeals, externally and internally directed, for encouraging truth telling. Seventy-two children from three age groups (5, 7, and 10 years of age) participated in a vignette study designed to examine these issues. Results showed that children believed that truth telling about an adult’s transgression would be more likely if negative outcomes were not expected than if they were expected. Further, children believed that either externally or internally focused encouragement would facilitate truth telling when negative outcomes were expected for truth telling. Beliefs about the propensity for truth telling were associated more with positive evaluations of truth telling than with negative evaluations of lying. These results have important implications for court cases in which children testify about an adult who has sworn them to secrecy and they are afraid to speak the truth.


The present research explores whether the type of relationship one holds with deceptive or honest actors influences cross-cultural differences in reward and punishment. Research suggests that Americans reward honest actors more than they punish deceptive perpetrators, whereas East Asians reward and punish equally (Wang & Leung, 2010). Our research suggests that the type of relationship with the actor matters for East Asians, but not for Americans. East Asians exhibit favoritism toward their friends by rewarding more than punishing them, but reward and punish equally when the actors are strangers (Experiment 1 and 2); Americans reward more than they punish regardless of the type of relationship (Experiment 2). Furthermore, the findings were replicated when the proposed mechanism – social mobility – was manipulated within the same culture (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how friends versus strangers are rewarded and punished in an increasingly relationally complex world.


Recent research suggests that individuals reward honesty more than they punish deception. Five experiments showed that different patterns of rewards and punishments emerge for North American and East Asian cultures. Experiment 1 demonstrated that Americans rewarded more than they punished, whereas East Asians rewarded and punished in equivalent amounts. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that these divergent patterns by culture could be explained by greater social mobility experienced by Americans. Experiments 4 and 5 examined how certain consequences of social mobility, approach-avoidance behavioral motivations and trust and felt obligation, can lead to disparate reward and punishment decisions within the two cultures. Moreover, Experiment 4 revealed that Americans exhibited stronger evaluative reactions toward deception but stronger behavioral intentions toward honesty; East Asians did not exhibit this evaluative-behavioral asymmetry. The cross-cultural implications for understanding rewards and punishments in an increasingly globalized world are discussed.

Children's use of deception in a naturalistic setting was observed longitudinally in 40 families when children were 2 and 4 years old, and again two years later. Goals included describing children's lying behavior and parents' reactions to lies, and comparing lies to other false statements. Lies were commonly told to avoid responsibility for transgressions, to falsely accuse siblings, and to gain control over another's behavior. Unlike children's other false statements (e.g., mistakes, pretense), lies were distinctly self-serving. Parents rarely addressed the act of lying itself but often challenged the veracity of lies or addressed the underlying transgression. Older siblings lied more often than younger ones, and parents who allowed older siblings to lie at Time 1 had children who lied more often at Time 2. Results are considered from a speech-act per-perspective and in terms of children's developing understanding of mental states.


Four- to twelve-year-old children's use of the verb "lying" and their moral judgment of true and false assertions was tested. Two types of stories were used in which a speaker was led to a false belief and therefore mistakenly produced either a false statement despite his truthful intentions or a true statement despite deceptive intentions. It was first tested whether children understood that the speaker held a false belief. As a test of moral judgment children were then asked to reward the speaker. Even 4-year-olds tended to reward according to the speaker's intentions and showed little sign of "moral realism" by rewarding according to the truth value of the assertion. As a test of the lexical definition of lying, children were first tested as to whether they understood that the falsity of the assertion by the well-meaning speaker was unintentional. Then they were asked whether this speaker had told a lie or not. Of those children who had given correct answers to the control questions (i.e., who understood that the speaker entertained a false belief and that the falsity of his assertion was therefore unintentional) most 4-year-olds, a fair proportion of 6-year-olds, but practically no 8-year-olds showed a realist concept of lying. They called the well-intended, mistakenly false statement a lie. This conceptual realism persisted even in children who just before had rewarded this speaker for his truthful intentions.


126 children (aged 4 yrs 2 mo to 5 yrs 11 mo) were told stories in which a protagonist with the intention to communicate truthfully said something false because he himself was mistaken. Ss were asked to judge whether the protagonist should be rewarded or punished for his false statement (moral judgment) and whether he had lied (lexical judgment). Replicating an earlier finding by the present authors (see record 1984-14615-001), there was a high number of inconsistent responses when the moral judgment was elicited first: Frequent subjectivist reward judgments were followed by realist "lying" judgments. Such an inconsistent response pattern was nearly absent when the
lexical judgment was elicited first. Here the frequent realist lying judgments led to subsequent realist punishment judgments. Findings show (1) that young children's moral intuition about lying is advanced as compared to their definition to lie and (2) that children's realist definition of to lie carries a strong negative moral connotation that overrides their usual subjectivist moral intuitions.


Person–situation interactions have attracted researchers’ attention for decades. Likewise, the current work focuses on the interaction of honesty–humility and situational conditions in bringing about counterproductive work behaviour (CWB). As such, we introduce perceptions of organizational politics as a situational construct representing an opportunity for CWB. In a sample of N¼148 employees we found that particularly individuals low in honesty–humility were affected by situational circumstances. By contrast, those high in honesty–humility reported practically the same (lower) amount of CWB independent of the level of perceptions of organizational politics. In other words, employees low in honesty–humility were especially likely to condition their behaviour on environmental factors, a result that mirrors previous findings.

**ii. Psychology – conceptual reviews**


Positive psychology needs an agreed-upon way of classifying positive traits as a backbone for research, diagnosis, and intervention. As a 1st step toward classification, the authors examined philosophical and religious traditions in China (Confucianism and Taoism), South Asia (Buddhism and Hinduism), and the West (Athenian philosophy, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) for the answers each provided to questions of moral behavior and the good life. The authors found that 6 core virtues recurred in these writings: courage, justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom, and transcendence. This convergence suggests a nonarbitrary foundation for the classification of human strengths and virtues.


Deceptive behavior can take the form of lying to save the feelings of another, lying to avoid punishment, and lying to the self / in order for us to understand its developmental course, as well as differences between individuals and groups, we need to distinguish between these different forms of deception in the very young [age and sex differences in lying, lying and IQ, facial/bodily masking while lying, cultural differences] / meaning of deception / self-deception / lies of children.

(No abstract)


Of all concealing behaviors, lying is probably one of the earliest to develop in childhood. It is also one of the least understood behaviors in terms of its prevalence, nosology, continuity over time, and relationship to other problem behaviors, especially delinquency. This paper presents a review of empirical studies on lying by children in the natural environment rather than in experimental situations. Studies are discussed that illustrate how widespread lying is in children between the ages of 4 and 18, and how adults judge this behavior in terms of seriousness. The relationships between lying and conduct problems and delinquency are pointed out in cross-sectional studies. Longitudinal studies indicate how well early lying predicts delinquency and other forms of maladjustment in adulthood. Conditions that either facilitate or inhibit children's lying are discussed. The findings are interpreted from a developmental point of view. The few available treatment studies are reviewed, and recommendations for improved interventions and prevention are formulated, together with directions for further investigations.


The veracity of child witness testimony is central to the justice system where there are serious consequences for the child, the accused, and society. Thus, it is important to examine how children's lie-telling abilities develop and the factors that can influence their truthfulness. The current review examines children's lie-telling ability in relation to child witness testimony. Although research demonstrates that children develop the ability to lie at an early age, they also understand that lie-telling is morally unacceptable and do not condone most types of lies. Children's ability to lie effectively develops with age and is related to their increasing cognitive sophistication. However, even children's early lies can be difficult to detect. Greater lie elaboration requires greater skill and children's ability to lie effectively improves with development and as a function of cognitive skill. Different methods of promoting children's truthful reports as well as the social and motivational factors that affect children's honesty will be discussed.


Though it is frequently condemned, lie-telling is a common and frequent activity in interpersonal interactions, with apparent social risks and benefits. The current review examines the development of deception among children. It is argued that early lying is normative, reflecting children's emerging cognitive and social development. Children lie to preserve self-interests as well as for the benefit of others. With age, children learn about the social norms that promote honesty while encouraging occasional prosocial lie-telling. Yet, lying can become a problem behavior with frequent or inappropriate use over time. Chronic lie-telling of any sort risks social consequences, such as the loss
of credibility and damage to relationships. By middle childhood, chronic reliance on lying may be related to poor development of conscience, weak self-regulatory control, and antisocial behavior, and it could be indicative of maladjustment and put the individual in conflict with the environment. The goal of the current chapter is to capture the complexity of lying and build a preliminary understanding of how children’s social experiences with their environments, their own dispositions, and their developing cognitive maturity interact, over time, to predict their lying behavior and, for some, their chronic and problem lying. Implications for fostering honesty in young children are discussed.


In this article we argue that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal deception by allowing people to avoid the cues to conscious deception that might reveal deceptive intent. Self-deception has two additional advantages: It eliminates the costly cognitive load that is typically associated with deceiving, and it can minimize retribution if the deception is discovered. Beyond its role in specific acts of deception, self-deceptive self-enhancement also allows people to display more confidence than is warranted, which has a host of social advantages. The question then arises of how the self can be both deceiver and deceived. We propose that this is achieved through dissociations of mental processes, including conscious versus unconscious memories, conscious versus unconscious attitudes, and automatic versus controlled processes. Given the variety of methods for deceiving others, it should come as no surprise that self-deception manifests itself in a number of different psychological processes, and we discuss various types of self-deception. We then discuss the interpersonal versus intrapersonal nature of self-deception before considering the levels of consciousness at which the self can be deceived. Finally, we contrast our evolutionary approach to self-deception with current theories and debates in psychology and consider some of the costs associated with self-deception.

### iii. Psychology – metanalysis


This meta-analysis provides a quantitative synthesis of paraverbal indicators of deception as a function of different moderator variables. Of nine different speech behaviours analysed only two were reliably associated with deception in the weighted, and four in the analysis unweighted by sample size. Pitch, response latency and speech errors were positively, message duration negatively related to deception. As most effect sizes were found to be heterogeneous, analyses of moderator variables revealed that many of the observed relationships varied as a function of content, preparation, motivation, sanctioning of the lie, experimental design and operationalization. Of different theoretical approaches reviewed, a working memory model of lie production may best account for the findings. Because of the small effect sizes, and the heterogeneity in findings, practitioners must be cautioned to use such indicators in assessing the truthfulness of reports but nonetheless practical implications for different types of situations are outlined.

### iv. Education – empirical studies

Concerns about academic honesty in higher education are widespread. To address this issue, faculty took part in a 3-year trial of a highly successful approach to academic honesty. Guiding this approach were an appreciation of student context, faculty orientation to student engagement, and available antiplagiarism technology.


**OBJECTIVES:** To assess undergraduate and postgraduate pharmacy students’ perceptions of plagiarism and academic honesty. **METHODS:** A questionnaire was administered to undergraduate and postgraduate pharmacy students to determine their levels of awareness of university policy concerning academic honesty; attitudes to plagiarism by rating the acceptability of a range of plagiarizing and cheating practices; and choice of appropriate penalties for a first and second occurrence. The choice of behaviors in response to a scenario about the preparation of a reading-based written assignment and the strategies that students would be prepared to use in order to submit the assignment on time were also assessed. **RESULTS:** Findings indicated widespread deficiencies in student knowledge of and attitudes towards plagiarism. Students did not perceive plagiarism as a serious issue and the use of inappropriate strategies for sourcing and acknowledging material was common. **CONCLUSIONS:** The study highlights the importance of achieving a balance among the 3 dimensions of plagiarism management: prevention, detection and penalty.

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### v. Education – conceptual reviews


In this commentary, I, a research participant in Hilary Conklin’s study, respond to her article by relating honesty to compassion and mindfulness. In addition to endorsing the intrapersonal honesty that Conklin supports in her article, I assert that interpersonal honesty can benefit the researcher, research participants, and research findings. I also argue that the elimination of suffering requires a mindfulness, compassion, and honesty that can withstand both future-oriented forces and fears.

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### vi. Business/economics – empirical studies

We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.


In this study, we examine whether, for a sample of retail chains, high levels of employee compensation can deter employee theft, an increasingly common type of fraudulent behavior. Specifically, we examine the extent to which relative wages (i.e., employee wages relative to the wages paid to comparable employees in competing stores) affect employee theft as measured by inventory shrinkage and cash shortage. Using two store-level data sets from the convenience store industry, we find that relative wages are negatively associated with employee theft after we control for each store's employee characteristics, monitoring environment, and socio-economic environment. Moreover, we find that relatively higher wages also promote social norms such that coworkers are less (more) likely to collude to steal inventory from their company when relative wages are higher (lower). Our research contributes to an emerging literature in management control that explores the effect of efficiency wages on employee behavior and social norms.


This study uses two experiments to investigate the honesty of managers' budget reports when the financial benefit resulting from budgetary slack is shared by the manager and other non-reporting employees. Drawing on moral disengagement theory, we predict that the shared interest in slack creation makes misreporting more self-justifiable to the manager and, therefore, leads to lower honesty. Consistent with our prediction, the results of our first experiment show that managers report less honestly when the benefit of slack is shared than when it is not shared, regardless of whether others are aware of the misreporting. Our second experiment investigates whether the preferences of the beneficiaries of the slack affect managers' honesty. We predict that managers' honesty will be improved when the beneficiaries of the slack have a known, higher-order preference for truthful reporting. Consistent with our prediction, the results show that managers report more honestly when other employees have a known preference for honesty than otherwise. The implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice are discussed.

An experiment tested whether groups lie more than individuals. Groups lied more than individuals when deception was guaranteed to maximize economic outcomes, but lied relatively less than individuals when honesty could be used strategically. These results suggest that groups are more strategic than individuals in that they will adopt whatever course of action best serves their economic interest.


In this paper, we study the effect of pre-play announcements and ex-post observation of decisions on voluntary public good provision. We find that requiring announcements, in conjunction with making contribution decisions public, has a significantly positive effect on the average level of contributions. Those treatments, in which announcements are elicited, permit the truthfulness of subjects’ announcements to be measured. We find that high contributors are more honest, the truthfulness of others is reciprocated with greater honesty and announcements are more honest when contribution decisions are observable.


This article investigates the stories told by Swedish men charged with bribery. The interviews are drawn from a study of court cases relating to bribery. White-collar criminals often justify their actions with reference to business culture: “Everyone’s doing it.” In this study, when refuting allegations, interviewees also invoke a “folk logic of bribery,” thus making use of mainstream cultural resources. Received ideas of a “real” bribe include the act itself, but also the moral character of the people involved. Accordingly, interviewees tailor a version in line with these ideas to refute the allegations against them.


(No abstract)

This study examines whether changes in salary and the horizontal equity of salary influence the degree of honesty in managerial reporting. The study makes a unique contribution by examining whether changes in honesty are different when they are in response to changes in an individual’s own salary than when they are in response to changes in the salary of his peers. The results showed that when horizontal equity was increased by increasing participant salary “with peer salary held constant”, the change in honesty was significantly different than when horizontal equity was increased by decreasing peer salary (with participant salary held constant). However, when horizontal equity was decreased, the effect on honesty was about the same, whether the decrease was accomplished by decreasing participant salary or increasing peer salary. The study also showed that after controlling for effects associated with experience with the task and participants’ own salary changes, perceived changes in the horizontal equity of participants’ salaries (measured by responses on a post-experiment questionnaire) were positively associated with changes in the degree of honesty in managerial reporting. In short, the results suggest that individuals make trade-offs among preferences for wealth, honesty, and horizontal equity, and that firms seeking to exploit honesty preferences should attempt to avoid the introduction of inequity.


A publisher uses an honor system for selling a newspaper in the street. The customers are supposed to pay, but they can also pay less than the price or not pay at all. We conduct an experiment to study honesty in this market. The results show that appealing to honesty increases payments, whereas reminding the customers of the legal norm has no effect. Furthermore, appealing to honesty does not affect the behavior of the dishonest. These findings suggest that some people have internalized an honesty norm, whereas others have not, and that the willingness to pay to obey the norm differs among individuals. In a follow-up survey study we find that honesty is associated with family characteristics, self-esteem, social connectedness, trust in the legal system, and compliance with tax regulations.


Research in budgeting suggests that subordinates may exhibit economically significant degrees of honesty, in spite of pecuniary incentives to do otherwise. This study continues the exploration of honesty in budgeting along two dimensions. First, unlike prior experiments, we measure the incremental effect of honesty by manipulating whether budget requests are made in the form of a factual assertion. Second, prior designs may have emphasized the ethical dimension of budgeting by granting the subordinate wide discretion over setting the budget, whereas we manipulate whether the subordinate or the superior has final authority over setting the budget. We find that less slack is created when budget communication requires a factual assertion in the subordinate authority treatment, but not when the superior has final authority. Hence, we find an incremental effect of honesty only when the subordinate has final authority. We conjecture, and provide some evidence, that this is due to subordinates framing the superior authority situation as one of negotiation where each party acts in his or her self-interest, rather than as an ethical dilemma. This view, that budgeting
is essentially devoid of ethical considerations, is consistent with some recent characterizations of budget practices.

vii. Business/economics – conceptual reviews


In previous literature on employee selection, leadership, and organizational trust, scholars have identified integrity as a central aspect of work behavior. However, despite important contributions, their work often has confused integrity with other concepts (especially honesty and conscientiousness) and has treated integrity as either a morally neutral or relativistic phenomenon. The philosophy of "Objectivism" solves these problems by providing a definition of integrity that distinguishes the term from related concepts and by integrating integrity into an objective code of morality. I discuss the implications of this perspective for the study of integrity in organizations.


It is often taken for granted that if more firms were innately honest or ethical this would be a good thing. We use the example of pollution policy to dispute such a claim. If regulation is by pollution tax social welfare is non-monotonic in population honesty. The choice of policy instrument may itself be characterised by 'reversals', with command- and-control methods being preferred for intermediate values of population honesty, a tax system being preferred at the extremes. This means that if - because of the spread of 'ethical shareholding' or for whatever reason - the honesty of the corporate population increases through time, we should not be surprised to see at first a switch away from market-based instruments, and then a switch back. Though environmental regulation is chosen as a context, the implications are more general.


(No abstract)


We develop a game-theoretical model of honesty and fairness to study cooperation in social dilemma games with communication. It is based on two key intuitions. First, players suffer a utility cost if they break norms of honesty and fairness, and this cost is highest if most others comply with the norm. Second, people are heterogeneous with regard to their concern for norms. We show that a model based on honesty norms alone cannot explain why pre-play communication fosters cooperation in simultaneous social dilemmas. In contrast, the model based on norms of honesty and fairness can.
We also illustrate other predictions of the model, offering experimental evidence in line with them—e.g., the effect of communication on cooperation depends on how many players communicate, and whether the social dilemma is played simultaneously or sequentially. In addition, ideas for new experiments are suggested.


We consider a model of strategic reputation for online sales using an exchange format. In the model sellers can sell a cheap good to build up reputation, and then cheat when selling a more expensive good. We identify conditions under which a seller will always be honest.


This paper introduces a new concept of full implementation that takes into account agents’ preferences for understanding how the process concerning honest reporting works. We assume that the agents have intrinsic preferences for honesty in the sense that they dislike the idea of lying when it does not influence their welfare but instead goes against the intention of the central planner. We show that the presence of such preferences functions in eliminating unwanted equilibria from the practical perspective, even if the degree of the preference for honesty is small. The mechanisms designed are detail free and involve only small fines.


This paper analyzes the determination of the optimal environment regulatory policy under imperfect competition when the firms differ in their polluting technologies and degree of honesty. We show that more honesty does not necessarily imply lower social losses. The effect of honesty in social welfare depends not only on the degree of honesty measured by the proportion of honest firms and their particular cost features but also on the industry structure.


(No abstract)


A model of the cultural co-evolution of honesty and capital is analyzed. It is shown that the sign of the payoff differential between honest and dishonest types depends on the ratio of benefits that an
employee gets from shirking to the resulting loss of revenue to the firm. If this ratio decreases with
capital accumulation, then multiple equilibria in output and honesty are possible in the long run.
Small changes in government corruptibility may have large long-run effects on per capita output and
the extent of honesty. The honesty and human capital of workers will be positively correlated.

viii. Communication – empirical studies

Texting and Interpersonal Awareness Narratives. In Proceedings of the 2010
ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work. (pp. 1–4). Savannah,
Georgia, USA: ACM press.

Managing one’s availability for interaction with others is an increasingly complex act, involving
multiple media and the sharing of many types of information. In this paper we draw on a field study
of 183 SMS users to introduce the idea of the “interpersonal awareness narrative” – the coherent,
plausible and sometimes deceptive stories that people tell each other about their availability and
activities. We examine participants’ use of deception in these accounts, and focus in particular on
“butler lies,” those lies told to enter or exit conversations or to arrange other interactions. We argue
that participants use this type of deception in SMS strategically, drawing on the inherent ambiguities
of SMS while maintaining plausible narratives.

Ott, M., Cardie, C., & Hancock, J. (2012). Estimating the prevalence of deception in
online review communities. In Proceedings of the 21st international conference on

Consumers’ purchase decisions are increasingly influenced by user-generated online reviews.
Accordingly, there has been growing concern about the potential for posting deceptive opinion
spam—fictitious reviews that have been deliberately written to sound authentic, to deceive the
reader. But while this practice has received considerable public attention and concern, relatively
little is known about the actual prevalence, or rate, of deception in online review com-
unities, and less still about the factors that influence it. We propose a generative model of deception which, in
con- junction with a deception classifier, we use to explore the prevalence of deception in six popular
online review communities: Expedia, Hotels.com, Orbitz, Priceline, TripAdvisor, and Yelp. We
additionally propose a theoretical model of online reviews based on economic signaling theory, in
which consumer reviews diminish the inherent information asymmetry between consumers and
producers, by acting as a signal to a product’s true, unknown quality. We find that deceptive opinion
spam is a growing problem overall, but with different growth rates across communities. These rates,
we argue, are driven by the different signaling costs associated with deception for each review
community, e.g., posting requirements. When measures are taken to increase signaling cost, e.g.,
filtering reviews written by first-time reviewers, deception prevalence is effectively reduced.

Seiter, J. S., Bruschke, J., & Bai, C. (2002). The acceptability of deception as a function
of perceivers’ culture, deceiver’s intention, and deceiver-deceived
relationship. Western Journal of Communication (includes Communication Reports), 66(2), 158-180.

This study explored the degree to which deception is perceived to be a socially acceptable form of communication. It was suspected that a liar’s motivation for deceiving, a perceiver’s cultural background, and the type of relationship between a liar and the target of a lie (e.g., spouse, friend, stranger, etc.) would affect the perceived acceptability of deceptive messages. Students from China and the United States rated the degree to which they perceived deceptive acts depicted in written scenarios as acceptable or unacceptable. Results indicated that 1) lies told for malicious or self-benefiting purposes were perceived as less acceptable than mutually-benefiting lies and lies that benefit others; and 2) culture and the type of relationship between liars and targets of lies interacted with motive for lying to affect the perceived acceptability of deception. These results, their implications, and avenues for future research are discussed.

ix. Philosophy – conceptual reviews


(No abstract)


Engaging a listener’s trust imposes moral demands upon a presenter in respect of truthtelling and completeness. An agent lies by an utterance that satisfies what are herein defined as signal and mendacity conditions; an agent deceives when, in satisfaction of those conditions, the agent’s utterances contribute to a false belief or thwart a true one. I advert to how we may fool ourselves in observation and in the perception of our originality. Communication with others depends upon a convention or practice of presumed nonuniversal truthfulness. In support of an asserted duty of nondeceptiveness, I offer a reconciliation of pertinent Kantian passages, a sketch of arguments within utilitarianism, contractarianism, and other views, and an account arguing for application of that duty to assertions, implicatures, omissions, equivocation, prevarication, and sophistry insofar as they affect listeners’ doxastic states. For scholarship, this duty is exceptionless. I describe the kernel of intellectual honesty as a virtuous disposition such that when presented with an incentive to deceive, the agent will not deceive. Intellectual honesty delivers candor when it counts. I contrast this with complementary virtues and the surpassing virtue of ingenuousness. An account is given of the connection between intellectual honesty and an influential physical model of integrity.


(No abstract)

x. Medicine/biology – empirical studies

In this paper a discussion of the strengths of a virtue-based approach to ethics in nursing is discussed. Virtue ethics is often depicted as vague and lacking in any convincing application to the reality of practice. It is argued that exploring issues from a virtue perspective offers the possibility of a sensitive moral response which is grounded in the context of the client and his family. Far from being vague, virtue ethics offers guidance in practice, but this guidance acknowledges the complexity of individual lives as opposed to the impartiality and abstract nature of traditional moral theory, rules and principles. The vehicle for discussion is a case in practice. The position presented here is that in taking account of the salient features of each individual case, withholding the truth from adults with a life threatening illness can be justified for compassionate reasons.

xi. **Medicine/biology – conceptual review**


The evolution of honest communication has recently become the focus of intense theoretical attention. However, strategic models dealing with honesty have largely ignored the implications of noise and perceptual error for signal evolution (just as models dealing with signal detection in the presence of noise ignore strategic issues). Here, I analyze an extended version of Maynard Smith’s strategic model of signaling of need between relatives, the Philip Sidney game, that incorporates the possibility of perceptual error. I show that even in the presence of noise, there exists over a wide range of parameter values a unique, continuously stable signaling equilibrium, at which the signaler employs a costly display when needy but refrains from doing so when healthy. For a subset of this range, there also exists a second, lower cost signaling equilibrium that is not continuously stable. At the former equilibrium, predicted signal cost is inversely related to the coefficient of relatedness (r) between signaler and receiver. Cost is not, however, predicted to drop to zero even when r = 1 and there is no conflict of interest between the two (as is the case in errorfree models), because it serves to enhance the efficacy of communication as well as to discourage deceit. Equilibrium signal cost is inversely related to the probability that the signaler is needy, and tends to increase with the level of noise. If noise becomes too great (i.e., if a detectable signal is too costly to produce), signaling is no longer stable; surprisingly, it is also unstable if the level of noise is too low (i.e., if a detectable signal is too cheap to produce).

xii. **Linguistics – empirical studies**


The meaning of the word lie (‘prevaricate’) consists in a cognitive prototype to which various real or imagined events may correspond in varying degrees. This view contrasts with the familiar one in
which word meanings consist of sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, and distinguish discretely between instances and non-instances. The relevance of the notions of PROTOTYPE and GRADIENCE in semantics has previously been established in physical and sensory lexical domains. The present paper shows that these notions are also relevant in abstract and social domains. Results are reported from an experiment which supports this view.

**Political science – empirical studies**


This article examines the impact that voters’ evaluations of the candidates’ character had on their vote choice in the 2000 presidential election. We find that while the magnitude of the impact of character on the vote was roughly equal for both major party candidates, contrary to common perception, the substantive significance of character evaluations disproportionately affected George W. Bush. Our results indicate the need to account for the influence of character in other elections, given that character issues are a recurring theme in American presidential campaigns.
Relevant studies involving children (Notes)


The effectiveness of self-instructional training using broad verbal mediators in promoting generalization of honest behavior was examined. First and fourth graders were assigned to 1 of 6 treatment conditions, generated from the combination of 3 levels of the terms employed in training (do-don't; cheating; honesty) and 2 types of instructional technique (self-instructional training; external instructions by experimenter). The procedures consisted of 5 pretreatment temptation tests in a first session, a treatment task and 5 posttreatment temptation tests in a second session, and a moral concept interview in a third session. Results indicated that the most general training term employed, "honesty," was most effective in promoting generalized honest behavior. This was particularly evident for females trained to use verbal self-instructions. Overall consistency of behavior significantly increased after training, though not as a result of a specific training condition. This increase was most pronounced for fourth graders. The significance of general verbal labels, limitations of self-instructional strategies, and consistency as a developmental variable are discussed.

- Purpose: evaluate the effectiveness of particular kinds of verbal instructions in promoting consistently honest behavior in children.
- Terms used in the study (in the strategies with children): “honesty,” “cheating.”
- 1st and 4th graders.
- Measures: frequency of cheating in a game/test (e.g. changing or adding answers after the time is up, working past the time limit, or looking at the answers before answering the test).
- Comparison of different combinations of conditions:
  - Child sees a videotape with a child being “punished” (the adult uses three different levels of terms: “do-don’t” –specific level-, “cheating,” or “honesty” –the more general and broad term).
  - Child is trained (the training is self-instructional, or “external” –the adult giving explicit instructions).
- Results: the use of the general term “honesty” was more effective in promoting generalized honest behavior, especially for girls who used verbal self-instructions.

Preschool (M = 4.9 years), second- (M = 7.8 years), and fifth- (M = 11.0 years) grade children’s definitions of moral standards for, and internal evaluative reactions to both lies and truthful statements were investigated. The influence of 4 factors on these judgments was also examined: the falsity of the statement, the content of the statement, whether or not the statement was believed, and whether or not the statement resulted in punishment. Results revealed that while the older children identified almost all statements correctly, preschoolers correctly identified about 70% of lies and truthful statements. Lies were rated as worse than truthful statements by all age groups; however, only the second and fifth graders ascribed feelings of pride to story characters after truthfulness. Implications of these findings for children’s moral development are discussed.

- Other sources:
  - “Lying and truthfulness are problematic sources:"
  - Children’s lying and truthfulness:
- Preschool, 2nd, and 5th grades.
- Measures: correct identification of lies and truthful statements; children’s evaluative reactions, such as guilt or pride, associated with lying and truthfulness; moral judgments of lies -vs- moral judgments truthfulness.
- Interviews about a series of vignettes which show children saying lies or truths about misdeed (e.g. braking a rule, taking something, damaging something).
Results: even preschoolers can identify lies and truthful statements about misdeeds. Lies were rated as worse than truthful statements by all age groups. Punishments affected the moral judgment of the preschoolers but not the other children. Only the second and fifth graders ascribed feelings of pride to story characters after truthfulness.


*We run an experiment to study the relationship between honesty, age and self-control. We focus on children aged between 5 and 15 as the literature suggests that self-control develops within such age range. We ask each child to toss a fair coin in private and to record the outcome (white or black) on a paper sheet. We only reward children who report white. Although we are unable to tell whether each child was honest or not, we speculate about the proportion of reported white outcomes. Children report the prize-winning outcome at rates statistically above 50% but below 100%. Moreover, the probability of cheating is uniform across groups based on child’s characteristics, in particular age. In a second treatment we explicitly tell children not to cheat. This request has a dampening effect on their tendency to over-report the prize-winning outcome, especially in girls. Furthermore, while this effect in boys is constant with age, in girls it tends to decrease with age.*

- Other sources:
  - Dishonesty in Psychology - children:
  - Internal rewards of being honest:
- Children between 5 and 15 attending an Italian summer camp.
- Children have to record their outcome with a coin (white or black), and they know that the researchers only reward who report white.
- Measures: % of reports of white outcome compared with the real probability of having a white outcome.
- Results: children report the prize-winning outcome at rates statistically above 50% and statistically below 100% Probability of cheating does not vary with age (maybe has nothing to do with self-control, which is a competence that increases with age). If the children are told not to cheat, the fraction of those who report the prize-winning outcome is reduced by 16%. The effect of the request is stronger for girls (although it tends to decrease with age for girls).


The veracity of child witness testimony is central to the justice system where there are serious consequences for the child, the accused, and society. Thus, it is important to examine how children’s lie-telling abilities develop and the factors that can influence their truthfulness. The current review examines children’s lie-telling ability in relation to child witness testimony. Although research demonstrates that children develop the ability to lie at an early age, they also understand that lie-telling is morally unacceptable and do not condone most types of lies. Children's ability to lie effectively develops with age and is related to their increasing cognitive sophistication. However, even children’s early lies can be difficult to detect. Greater lie elaboration requires greater skill and children’s ability to lie effectively improves with development and as a function of cognitive skill. Different methods of promoting children’s truthful reports as well as the social and motivational factors that affect children’s honesty will be discussed.

- CONCEPTUAL REVIEW
- Purpose: examine children’s lie-telling ability in relation to child witness testimony.
- History of research about dishonesty (lie-telling):
  o Scientific study in the development of lying began in the 20th century (first stages of the field of developmental psychology).
  o With behaviorism these studies decreased.
  o About 3 decades ago lying became a focus of investigation.
- Gaps in the field:
  o “Few studies have investigated children’s abilities to tell fabricated stories (...) a fabricated story is a report where a person intentionally lies.” (p. 338).
Motivations for children’s lie-telling.

Familiarity and perceived authority of the interviewer on children’s truth and lie-telling.

- Talwar and Lee (2008) found that children’s lying conduct wasn’t related to their understanding of lies, but by their moral evaluations of the statements.
- Children can start lying since they are 2 or 3 years old.
- Measures/procedures: modified Temptation Resistance Paradigm.

Creating and maintaining a lie is related to cognitive development processes:

- “Theory of Mind” (ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, and recognize other’s beliefs, desires, and intentions). Lying implies wanting to intentionally instill a false belief in other person – awareness that we are manipulating other people’s beliefs.
- Executive functioning (psychological processes that serve to control and monitor thought and action) – for instance, working memory and inhibitory control (to not tell the truth).

Strategies to promote truth-telling:

- Asking children to promise to tell the truth (Lyon et al., 2008; Talwar et al., 2002, 2004).
- Truth promoting impacts children’s behavior through their assessment of whether honesty versus dishonesty affects their self-interest (cost-benefit analysis) (Bandura, 1991; Bussey, 1992; Lyon, 2000).
- Talwar and Arruda (2012) preliminary findings suggest that children may be more motivated to tell the truth when they are exposed to models of rewards for saying the truth, as opposed to models of punishment for lying.

Other sources:

- Child witnesses:

- Definition of lying:

  **Children’s understanding of lies:**

  **Children’s lies about their own behavior:**
  - Research using modified Temptation Resistance Paradigm:


Children’s lies about another’s wrongdoing:


Seiter, J. S., Bruschke, J., & Bai, C. (2002). The acceptability of deception as a function of perceivers’ culture, deceiver’s intention,


  - **Children’s cognitive development and lie-telling:**

  - **Strategies to promote truth-telling:**
    - **Asking children to promise to tell the truth:**

  - **Cost-benefit analysis:**

  - **Models of reward -vs- models of punishment:**
    - Talwar and Arruda (2012). Honesty is the best policy: the effects expected punishment and appeals to tell the truth on children’s truth-telling behavior. Submitted for publication.

This study examined the effects of coaching (encouragement and rehearsal of false reports) and truth induction (a child-friendly version of the oath or general reassurance about the consequences of disclosure) on 4- to 7-year-old maltreated children’s reports (N=198). Children were questioned using free recall, repeated yes–no questions, and highly suggestive suppositional questions. Coaching impaired children’s accuracy. For free-recall and repeated yes–no questions, the oath exhibited some positive effects, but this effect diminished in the face of highly suggestive questions. Reassurance had few positive effects and no ill effects. Neither age nor understanding of the meaning and negative consequences of lying consistently predicted accuracy. The results support the utility of truth induction in enhancing the accuracy of child witnesses’ reports. The results support the utility of truth induction in enhancing the accuracy of child witnesses' reports.

- Purpose: examine factors influencing dishonesty in a sample of maltreated children. Specific focus on how adults influence dishonesty.
- Two forms of dishonest behaviors:
  - false denials of true events and
  - false allegations of untrue events.
- Dishonest behavior in children could be influenced by:
  - A third person, or an “instigator” who is involved in the action the child is lying about.
  - The person to whom the children lie, or the “recipient.”
  - Characteristics of the child (e.g. age and attitudes about morality and utility of dishonesty).
- Truth induction: premised on the notion that children behaves in a dishonest way depending on the perceived consequences of honesty and dishonesty (Bandura, 1991; Bussey, 1992).
- “A primary motive for young children’s lies is to avoid punishment for misdeeds” (Bussey, 1992; DePaulo, Jordan, Irvine, & Laser, 1982; Ekman, 1989; Stouthamer-Loeber & Loeber, 1986).


- Research questions of the article:
  - How should oath-taking competence be evaluated?
- How should the oath be administered?

Relevant ideas taken from developmental psychology and research about children’s lying and truthfulness:

- Research in developmental psychology reviewed by law (children witnesses) give clues about:

  1. Whether children understand the difference between a truthful statement and a lie.
     - Pipe & Wilson (1994): compared different methods for assessing understanding (ask children explaining the differences between truth and lies, and ask children identifying whether a false statement is “truth or lie”). They found that only 8% of the six-year-olds were able to explain the differences, but most of them were able to identify the lie.
       - Results suggest that it would be better to assess children’s understanding of truths and lies using the second methods.
       - HOWEVER, there are some methodological limitations (that could also happen in other studies):
         - It is possible that some children guess randomly (50% chance) when they are asked to say whether a statement is true or false.
         - Asking the difference between a true statement and a lie could be difficult (it could be better to ask them just to define each word independently).
         - The second method implies a simple answer, whereas the first method implies a multi-word answer (BUT see next idea).
     - There is little evidence that defining a lies is more difficult for children than identify them. Even 5-year-olds are able to define what is a lie (again, “any apparent superiority of identification over definition must be qualified by the risks that in some of the studies using identification tasks, children’s apparent understanding may have been inflated somewhat by guessing and biases to respond “yes””, p. 1032-1033).

  2. Whether children understand the wrongfulness of lying.
     - Studies demonstrate that both maltreated and non-maltreated children “are clearly aware of the consequences of lying at an early age” (p. 1051) (i.e. 3 years old, 5 years old).

- Variables associated to dishonest behaviors:
  - Teacher characteristics (e.g., lack of enthusiasm for teaching, poor quality of teaching, little respect/acceptance of student input, and inconsistent authoritarian methods).
  - Low levels of student interest in the subject, lack of respect for the teacher.
  - Testing and grading practices (e.g., quality of the test, type of test format, competitive environments, pressure on students to get good grades).
  - Failure experiences and low grades.
  - Situations of minimum risk and high incentive to cheat.
  - High levels of peer tolerance for dishonest behaviors, peer norms, exposure to others’ dishonest behaviors, interest to attain favorable social status with peers or to avoid comparison with less-esteemed groups.
  - Permissive or severe punishment parental practices.

- Interventions for dishonest behaviors:
  - Deterrent practices (e.g., threats of punishment, direct appeals to morality or public affirmation): rarely successful.
  - Behavioral management (e.g., timeout, reinforcement): limited results suggest that these practices could be effective to reduce dishonest behaviors.
  - Classroom and school-wide prevention strategies:
    - Suggestions based on research (little evidence of effective approaches to prevent dishonesty):
      - Modification of teacher’s style, attitudes towards students, and classroom management skills.
      - Modification of evaluation practices and attitudes.
      - Increased use of curtailment procedures.
      - Individual conferences with suspected students.

- Other authors (references):
Atkins & Atkins (1936)
Burton (1963)
Burton Maccoby & Allinsmith (1961)
Drake (1941)
Fischer (1970)
Houser (1982)
Johson & Klores (1968)
Kanfer & Duerfeldt (1968)
Kelly & Worrell (1978)
Miller & Klungness (1986)
Millham (1974)
Montor (1971)
Patterson (1982)
Patterson, Reid, Jones & Conger (1975)
Peskay (1977)
Schab (1969)
Schab (1980)
Shelton & Hill (1969)
Shrik & Hoffman (1961)
Shu-Fang (1974)
Steiner (1930)
Steiner (1932)
Steiningier, Johson & Kirts (1964)
Tittle (1973)
Tittle & Rowe (1973)
Trabue (1962)
Vandewiele (1980)
Vitro (1971)
Vitro & Schoer (1972)
Weldon (1966)

- Preeschoolers:
  - Most children have already lied by their 4th birthday to avoid punishment.
  - Preeschoolers also love to make up stories. They don’t have yet a clear sense of what’s real and what’s fantasy.

**Possible questions:**
1. What factors influence children’s honest behaviors?
2. What strategies help to promote children’s honest behaviors?

**Interventions:**
1. Positive Action (Flay et al. 2003, 2005):
   - Strategy: Social/emotional positive actions for being honest with oneself and others
   - Outcome: % disciplinary referrals for falsification of reports

2. WWCC:
   - Building Decision Skills with Community Service
   - Child Development Project
   - Just Communities
   - Learning for Life
   - Open Circle Program (Reach Out to Schools)
   - PATHS
   - Seattle Social Development Project
   - The ESSENTIAL Curriculum (Project ESSENTIAL)